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Will IE6 be the next NT4?

1st October 2009 All penetration testers will remember the long tail of Windows NT 4.0, and how this operating system continued to be used long past the point when security updates stopped at the end of 2004. For many years the presence of an unpatchable NT4 server was a common issue in a penetration test report, and it is only now, almost five years after security support ended, that finding an NT4 system on a network is becoming a rare event. Read More

One in four web applications susceptible to high risk security flaws

7th September 2009 NTA Monitor has reported a 10% increase in the total number of web applications found to have at least one high-risk security issue... Read More

Organisations facing a changing threat landscape

20th July 2009 According to NTA Monitor's 2009 Annual Security Report, the average number of Internet security vulnerabilities is on the rise... Read More

The Return of the Insider Threat

1st July 2009 When NTA started security testing twelve years ago, the main focus was on the insider threat. There were many reports with statistics showing that most security breaches were due to insiders. By contrast there was very little focus on the external threat via Internet and third-party network links. Back then many companies did not even have a firewall. Read More

Annotated tcpdump packet trace on ftp server

# Hacker -< Server:21 TCP Handshake

# Note: The Hacker's source port has been changed from 1035 to 62230 and
# the Server IP address has been changed from 194.217.26.147 to 10.1.13.5
15:29:24.560482 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: S 1849799952:1849799952(0)
15:29:24.560482 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: S 2690657606:2690657606(0) ack 1849799953 15:29:24.560482 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: . 1:1(0) ack 1

# Server:21 -< Hacker "220 FTP server ready."

15:29:24.590479 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: P 1:24(23) ack 1 15:29:24.590479 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: . 1:1(0) ack 24

# Hacker -< Server:21 "USER anonymous"

15:29:37.169366 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: P 1:17(16) ack 24 15:29:37.169366 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: . 24:24(0) ack 17

# Server:21 -< Hacker "331 Guest login ok, send your complete e-mail..." 

15:29:37.169366 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: P 24:92(68) ack 17 15:29:37.269357 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: . 17:17(0) ack 92

# Hacker -< Server:21 "PASS rsh@"

15:29:44.418749 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: P 17:28(11) ack 92

# Server:21 -< Hacker "230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply"

 15:29:44.428749 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: P 92:140(48) ack 28 15:29:44.518741 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: . 28:28(0) ack 140

# Hacker -< Server:21

"PORT 195,102,196,156,211,93" (195.102.196.156:54109) # Note: The PORT command has been we-written from 195,102,193,28,38,148 # to 195,102,196,156,211,93. Both the IP address and the port have been # changed.
15:30:10.350623 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: P 28:57(29) ack 140

# Server:21 -< Hacker "200 PORT command successful."

15:30:10.350623 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: P 140:170(30) ack 57 15:30:10.450633 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: . 57:57(0) ack 170

# Hacker -< Server:21 "LIST"

15:30:16.261216 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: P 57:63(6) ack 170

# Server:20 -< Hacker:54109 TCP Handshake

# Note: Although this is directed towards the hacker, the Firewall changes
# the Destination IP address to be the victim on the way out.
15:30:16.261216 > 10.1.13.5.20 > 195.102.196.156.54109: S 2749222487:2749222487(0)
15:30:16.261216 < 195.102.196.156.54109 > 10.1.13.5.20: S 3823327867:3823327867(0) ack 2749222488 15:30:16.261216 > 10.1.13.5.20 > 195.102.196.156.54109: . 1:1(0) ack 1

# Server:21 -< Hacker "

150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for..." 15:30:16.271217 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: P 170:233(63) ack 63

# Server:20 -< Hacker Directory listing

15:30:16.271217 > 10.1.13.5.20 > 195.102.196.156.54109: P 1:70(69) ack 1

# FTP data TCP shutdown

15:30:16.271217 > 10.1.13.5.20 > 195.102.196.156.54109: F 70:70(0) ack 1 15:30:16.271217 < 195.102.196.156.54109 > 10.1.13.5.20: . 1:1(0) ack 70 15:30:16.271217 < 195.102.196.156.54109 > 10.1.13.5.20: . 1:1(0) ack 71 15:30:16.371227 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: . 63:63(0) ack 233 15:30:16.591249 < 195.102.196.156.54109 > 10.1.13.5.20: F 1:1(0) ack 71 15:30:16.591249 > 10.1.13.5.20 > 195.102.196.156.54109: . 71:71(0) ack 2

# Server:21 -< Hacker "226 Transfer complete."

15:30:16.591249 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: P 233:257(24) ack 63 15:30:16.691259 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: . 63:63(0) ack 257

# Hacker -< Server:21 "QUIT"

15:30:22.641843 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: P 63:69(6) ack 257

# Server:21 -< Hacker "221-You have transferred..." 

(two packets) 15:30:22.641843 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: P 257:303(46) ack 69

# FTP control TCP shutdown

15:30:22.651844 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: FP 303:441(138) ack 69 15:30:22.661845 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: . 69:69(0) ack 442 15:30:22.661845 < 195.102.196.156.62230 > 10.1.13.5.21: F 69:69(0) ack 442 15:30:22.661845 > 10.1.13.5.21 > 195.102.196.156.62230: . 442:442(0) ack 70